Oblivion Mod:Stirk/The Supposition of Freedom

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In his work, The Purity of Freedom, Iman Kanten argued for the independence of freedom from the influence of action and the physical world. In this work, I respond by citing contradictory points of evidence.

Introduction: The Gift of Freedom

What does freedom entail for us' This question is of penultimate importance, but I can only address it shortly for fear of revealing my own ignorance on the subject. Freedom, I believe, exists in its expression as rationality. It allows us to evaluate our own actions and stands as its own final judge, and it separates us from the lesser beasts and slaves (by which I mean the absolute, bound servants of the Daedra) who seem to have no control over their lives.

The Presupposition of Freedom and Its Effects on Our Actions

Are sentient creatures truly free' Consider this: when I will (and by 'will' I do not mean to imply some great power on my own part - the words 'will' and 'want' are almost interchangeable here, but I emphasize the notion of free will in my selection) some event to occur and it seems that I possess the necessary capabilities to spur that event's transpiration, the actual fruition of that event is not guaranteed. That is, sentient creatures are not absolutely capable of free action. Why does this case exist' From my investigations, it would seem that it is the result of two complementary factors: the existence of prophecy and the nature of the Aedra as the world's creators. Based on my conclusions here, I will examine the issue of free will as well.

As has been witnessed for countless generations, the power of prophecy and destiny cannot be denied. Their effects have reshaped the political (through the existence and current state of the Empire) and physical (i.e. the Western Warp) landscapes of our continent, and they have indelibly altered our perceptions of the world. In analyzing the concept of freedom, prophecy must be examined because we must question the degree to which it affects a sentient creature; that is, does prophecy alter not only our actions but even our mental states as well' We shall examine this question through the construction of artificial worlds in which the alternatives are the case. In the first world, we shall assume that prophecy binds only our actions and not our thoughts. In this world, those under the influence of prophecy would be forced to act in spite of their will; this idea strikes me as exceedingly odd. Historically, those under the power of prophecy have acted with an unparalleled surety, which seems counterintuitive considering the awkwardness with which we - and by this I mean ordinary individuals - approach actions that disagree with our thoughts. Consider the example of unwilling executioner raising his blade, or the example of an obstinate child grudgingly obeying his mother; in both cases, the person's actions disagree with their thoughts. Certainly this is not to say that those under prophecy's hold do not have doubts, but a difference exists between doubt and the contradiction of thoughts and actions. This evidence seems to quiet the thought that prophecy guides only our actions.

If this is the case, however, we have thus lost a degree of freedom; prophecy must guide both our thoughts and our actions. Therefore, because prophecy binds us both physically and rationally, we retain essentially no freedom when acting under its influence. This idea threatens the very foundations of our freedom; it has been argued that every event, no matter how great or how small, can be prophesized or that a prophecy already exists for it - the prophets simply don't waste their time finding every inane aspect of the future. If every action or event has an associated prophecy to guide it, then no action is of our own will.

In addressing this issue, it is important to note that a potential solution has been offered to counter this apparently deterministic view. Certainly, it is difficult to argue against the notion that a prophecy exists for each of our actions; however, if we examine the extent to which destiny actually determines our individual actions, the answer becomes significantly more clouded. While the eventual consequence or result may be determined, the means by which we reach that result could remain unwritten. This idea can be presented with the analogy of being in a closed room (representing fate). We are trapped within this room, but we are allowed a degree of freedom in that room. The analogy works only on such a simple scale, however, because each individual 'free' action may be governed by a smaller determination - this idea extends from the decision to kill another person to the decision we make in regulating the rate of our breathing. It would seem that essentially every aspect of our lives could be determined.

The second problem with the notion of freedom resides in the constitution of the Aedra, our creators. Collectively, the Aedra represent stasis, the inability to change. I will not address the peculiarities and apparent paradoxes of the Aedra in this volume (i.e. the fact that the Aedra can be killed, which would represent a shift in existence, while they embody stasis), but I will address one aspect of the nature of the Aedra because of its relevance to the topic at hand.

The Aedra created our world (once more, a paradox given their nature), but the Aedra represent immutability. Freedom represents the ability to change, the ability to shift in thought and action from a destined course. How could the unchanging Aedra create a world in which its denizens possess something that they themselves do not' Perhaps the Aedra created a world in which something of a lesser version of their nature might exist and amuse them, some shady image of themselves. Given this information, the question becomes more complex and interesting: are even the Aedra free, and if so, does that necessarily mean that we ourselves are free as well'

The first question we can never properly answer, for lack of proper evidence. They created the worlds and the laws which may suggest or refute the possibility of mortal freedom (depending upon whether they are free or not). However, did they create these laws spontaneously or did they base them off of higher laws by which they are themselves governed' Could they have created any other world than the one they did' These questions only dance around the originally proposed question but still touch on its edges. We can never determine whether the Aedra are controlled by unseen forces or if they act with true autonomy. The second part of the question, once more, cannot be properly addressed as of yet. Even presuming that the Aedra are free, what will they might have had in our creation (i.e. whether to make us free or not) cannot be determined - did they want something true to their image, or are we simply some sort of experiment of existence'

Unfortunately, it seems that I can merely raise questions and not properly answer them. However, this work has hopefully inspired questions worth consideration within the reader's mind. These are the sorts of questions which drive us as sentient creatures, and answering them must be an imperative for our kind.